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TEXTUALISM FOR REALISTS
Ian Samuel *
THE JUSTICE OF CONTRADICTIONS: ANTONIN SCALIA AND THE
POLITICS OF DISRUPTION. By Richard L . Hasen, New Haven and
London: Yale University Press. 2018. Pp. xvi, 178. $30.
INTRODUCTION
The sudden death of Antonin Scalia was a monumental event. 1 Politically, it set off a confirmation battle over President Obama’s chosen nominee,
Merrick Garland—a battle that the president lost when the Senate did not
hold hearings on the nomination. 2 And there is very good evidence that the
vacancy played a major factor in the quite close 2016 presidential election of
Donald Trump. 3 Instead of Garland, Scalia was replaced by Neil Gorsuch, 4 a
conservative and a self-described textualist and originalist in the mold of
Scalia himself. 5 A little over a year later, at the end of October Term 2017,
Anthony Kennedy announced his retirement; the president’s chosen replacement, Brett Kavanaugh, is widely expected to be more conservative

* Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer School of Law. For their
helpful comments, thanks to Will Baude, Dan Epps, Barry Friedman, Richard Re, Shalev
Roisman, Shannon McHugh Samuel, Matt Owen, and Eugene Volokh. I am especially grateful
to Rick Hasen himself, who both discussed the book with me in an interview and gave me written comments on an earlier draft that have substantially improved this Review.
1. Adam Liptak, Antonin Scalia, Justice on the Supreme Court, Dies at 79, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/02/14/us/antonin-scalia-death.html (on file
with the Michigan Law Review).
2 . See Adam Liptak, Study Calls Snub of Obama’s Supreme Court Pick Unprecedented,
N.Y. TIMES (June 13, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/us/politics/obamasupreme-court-merrick-garland.html [https://perma.cc/9RBE-TL2P].
3. Exit polling in 2016 showed that “a majority of those who saw the president’s ability
to nominate justices to the high court as the most important factor in their vote backed
Trump,” and while “26 percent of Trump voters told pollsters that Supreme Court nominees
were the most important factor in their voting,” only “18 percent of Hillary Clinton voters . . .
said the same.” Philip Bump, A Quarter of Republicans Voted for Trump to Get Supreme Court
Picks — And It Paid Off, WASH. POST (June 26, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/
politics/wp/2018/06/26/a-quarter-of-republicans-voted-for-trump-to-get-supreme-courtpicks-and-it-paid-off/[https://perma.cc/WBQ9-PMAA].
4. Adam Liptak & Matt Flegenheimer, Neil Gorsuch Confirmed by Senate as Supreme
Court Justice, N.Y. TIMES (April 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/07/us/politics/
neil-gorsuch-supreme-court.html (on file with the Michigan Law Review).
5 . E .g ., Richard L. Hasen, Gorsuch Is the New Scalia, Just as Trump Promised, L.A.
TIMES (June 27, 2017. 3:00 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-hasengorsuch-scalia-20170627-story.html [https://perma.cc/G4LM-3BJV].
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than Kennedy. 6 The death of the Court’s most iconic conservative member
may thus have ironically created the most conservative Court in a very long
time, with Chief Justice John Roberts likely occupying the position of the
median justice—for now.
These are interesting developments to consider alongside Rick Hasen’s 7
newest book, The Justice of Contradictions: Antonin Scalia and the Politics of
Disruption. In it, Hasen offers up the first posthumous, book-length assessment of Scalia’s judicial legacy—the book is very consciously not a biography—and finds it largely wanting. Justice Scalia, he says, should be understood as the judicial equivalent of Donald Trump and Newt Gingrich—a
“disruptor,” whose style deliberately delegitimized the institution of which
he was a member (p. 5).
Hasen’s book ought to be read by everyone with a strong opinion about
Justice Scalia, in either direction. Skeptics of Scalia, of course, will find much
to nod at. But actually, my recommendation is especially true for the justice’s
admirers—who will find much to disagree with in the book, but who nonetheless ought to read it to understand what is likely to be the party line of sophisticated Scalia skeptics in the years to come. And although neither virtue
counts for much in the academic press, for what it is worth, the book is very
readable and (a virtue Scalia himself would have appreciated) admirably free
of filler—Hasen gets to the point.
Hasen, to his credit, resists the most hysterical claims of Scalia’s critics
and offers a measured—but decidedly opinionated—take. When Hasen refers to Scalia as a “justice of contradictions,” he does not really mean that the
good and bad in Scalia were complex; rather, he largely seems to mean that
Scalia was a jurist who contradicted what Scalia himself held out to be the
good. Though Scalia may have professed fealty to the text of statutes or to
the Constitution’s original meaning, Hasen argues this fealty was flexible
enough to permit outcomes that were politically agreeable to Scalia (p. 48).
Despite what Scalia spent his life arguing, textualism and originalism do not
impose any real constraints on judges’ discretion. In the end, Hasen says, it’s
all politics, and he seeks to demonstrate this by examining Scalia’s decisions
in a dizzying area of substantive areas—everything from abortion to election
law to criminal procedure. In almost all of these areas, Scalia’s methods
proved flexible enough to permit him to reach outcomes consistent with
what Hasen believes about Scalia’s personal political beliefs (he calls him a
“conservative libertarian” who was skeptical of government power 8).
6 . See, e .g ., Jordan Klein, et al., We Measured Brett Kavanaugh’s Likely Impact on the
Court, CROOKED (July 12, 2018), https://crooked.com/article/kavanaugh-supreme-court/,
[https://perma.cc/QXN3-7ZTU] (using Judicial Common Space scores to conclude this).
7. Chancellor’s Professor of Law and Political Science, University of California, Irvine
School of Law.
8. P. 48. Although this observation is beyond the scope of this review, I will note that
this is not how Scalia would have described his own politics, and it does not ring true to me. Cf .
Antonin Scalia, The Two Faces of Federalism, 6 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 19, 22 (1982) (“I urge
you then—as Hamilton would have urged you—to keep in mind that the federal government is
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If that were all Hasen said, his book would not be nearly as interesting as
it is. But Hasen does not argue that this flexibility is solely a feature of Scalia’s preferred legal methods. His claim is more sophisticated. He says this indeterminate flexibility is a feature of all judicial philosophies. Neither “textualism [nor] any other set of interpretive rules will restrict judicial discretion,”
he says, and the outcomes in the most important cases will always be “driven
by ideology and a sense of fair results” (pp. 36–37; emphasis added). In other
words, Justice Ginsburg, no less than her old opera companion, is also just
voting her politics, albeit using a very different legal method. For that matter,
so is Justice Kagan, despite her professed fealty to textualism. Scalia “was not
more ideologically driven or results-oriented than his fellow justices” (p. 63);
that is just what judges do, in Hasen’s view, and we should stop pretending
otherwise.
In this Review, I argue that for a person on the political left, in the contingent historical circumstances of the United States in 2018, it would be disastrous as a practical matter to accept or profess this position. Even if a person buys in to Hasen’s realist critique, there are good reasons to advocate for
relatively formal methods like textualism and originalism. First, such methods are certainly no worse than any other methods, insofar as all decisionmaking philosophies are equally indeterminate in Hasen’s account. Second, and more important, formal methods are demonstrably capable—at
least in some cases!—of getting otherwise conservative judges to vote for
outcomes that they may not personally like. Given that the Supreme Court
may be in the hands of conservative judges for the next twenty-five years, if
you are on the political left (as Hasen is, and as I am), some account of how
to restrain those conservative judges is of the highest priority.
I.

TEXT, HISTORY, AND OTHER DISTRACTIONS

Aside from a roughly twenty-page interlude that concerns writing style
(which I will discuss later), Hasen’s argument is about Justice Scalia’s substantive judicial legacy. In particular, Hasen is skeptical—deeply skeptical—
about textualism and originalism, the two pillars of Scalia’s method. The
book’s second chapter is an extended, critical discussion of textualism as an
interpretive theory, the title of which (“Word Games”) gives a sense of
Hasen’s attitude about it. Reducing “serious legal disputes to word games”
leads, he says, to “unfair results” and is “not at all in line with how legislators
and their staffs who write the statutes view their jobs” (p. 30). Relying on the

not bad but good. The trick is to use it wisely.”). Of course, self-description should not be credited uncritically. In fairness, to the extent Hasen meant the descriptor to apply to Scalia’s freespeech jurisprudence, it is more on the mark; that is how he put it in a discussion with me
about the book. Dan Epps & Ian Samuel, In Recess #8: “Would You Rather”, FIRST MONDAYS
26:02–27:49 (Aug. 13, 2018), https://www.firstmondays.fm/episodes/2018/8/13/in-recess-8would-you-rather [https://perma.cc/Z6MN-B6YR].
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work of Abbe Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman, 9 he argues that given how
drafters in Congress actually work, “text cannot fairly be the only consideration” (p. 31). And originalism fares no better (Chapter Three). Hasen’s broad
attack on originalism opens by quoting Justice Alito making a sarcastic joke
about it at oral argument 10 and concludes by describing the “notion that
judges can use originalist methods to ‘find’ or ‘discover’ the law, rather than
make it,” as a proven “illusion” (p. 63).
Skepticism about textualism and originalism are not new. But Hasen’s
claim goes quite a bit further than most critics’, a fact that emerges over the
course of the book but becomes especially clear by the closing pages. In those
pages, he quotes remarks that Scalia gave to the Philadelphia Bar Association
in 2004: “As long as judges tinker with the Constitution to ‘do what the people want,’ instead of what the document actually commands, politicians who
pick and confirm new federal judges will naturally want only those who
agree with them politically.” 11 Part of that, says Hasen, is “exactly right”:
“Justices who approached the Constitution as a living document were likely
to be swayed by many factors, including public opinion and their own values, in deciding difficult cases” (pp. 177–78). But Hasen argues that no matter one’s judicial method, it is impossible—Hasen uses that word—to “objectively and neutrally determine what the Constitution ‘actually commands’ ”
(p. 178). There is “no methodology” that can do that, argues Hasen, and so
“[u]ncertainty in interpretation is inevitable” (p. 178). All that politicians
who choose judges can hope for, on this view, is that judges will vote the policy preferences the politicians themselves share. The Supreme Court “has always been a political institution,” says Hasen (p. 178)—and always will be.
This situates Hasen’s argument comfortably within the space created by
some combination of the attitudinal model of judicial decisionmaking and
the indeterminacy thesis. The former is an empirical model of judicial behavior in which Supreme Court justices simply vote their policy preferences. 12 In other words, the attitudinal model of judging is one where “Su-

9. Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—
An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L.
REV. 901 (2013).
10. P. 40. As Hasen notes, Alito is a consistent critic of originalist methods, though he
does not speculate about why that might be. Cf . ROBERT BOLT, A MAN FOR ALL SEASONS
(1960) (speculating about the dangers in eliminating formal constraints on power in the name
of attacking a powerful adversary who might, all things considered, prefer that the barriers to
his counterattack be eliminated).
11. P. 177 (quoting Bill Mears, ‘Get Over It’: Justice Scalia’s Most Memorable Quotes,
FOX NEWS (Feb. 15, 2016), https://www.foxnews.com/politics/get-over-it-justice-scalias-mostmemorable-quotes [https://perma.cc/Y8UZ-TCUM]).
12 . See Vanessa A. Baird, Book Review, 66 J. POL. 1304, 1304 (2004) (reviewing JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002)) (arguing “there are few areas of research in the field of judicial politics that
are not a response to this book or in some way built on its foundation”). See generally JEFFREY
A. SEGAL & HAROLD J. SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL
REVISITED (2002).
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preme Court justices’ decisions are driven purely by their sincere, onedimensional ideological preferences.” 13 This descriptive claim is obviously
controversial, 14 but it also (like it or not) has significant predictive power in
the real world. 15 When Hasen says that the Court is a “political institution”
and that decisions are driven by ideology and a sense of fair results, I take
him to express at least bounded agreement with this view. (Perhaps unsurprisingly, in addition to being a lawyer, Hasen is a political scientist, a group
that has always been more comfortable with this model than pure lawyers.)
The indeterminacy thesis is a more theoretical claim. 16 A proposition of
law is said to be “indeterminate” if the ordinary materials of legal analysis
(statutes, case law, regulations, and all the rest) are insufficient to resolve the
question “is this proposition legally correct?”—or rather, could equally support “this proposition is legally correct” and “this proposition is legally incorrect.” 17 Nearly everyone agrees that at least some legal propositions (such
as “highly contentious Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Constitution”) are indeterminate in that sense. 18 But true believers in the indeterminacy thesis think that nearly all legal propositions—at least, all legally interesting propositions—are indeterminate. 19 I do not know if Hasen would go
that far, but he repeatedly refers to the indeterminacy of the right answer at
least in “the most difficult cases” (p. 178); this can be fairly read as subscription to some version of the indeterminacy thesis.
A lot of people believe the attitudinal model and the indeterminacy thesis are correct, and both have been defended on empirical and theoretical
grounds for a long time (and disagreed with on those grounds for an equally
long time). What Hasen essentially attempts to do, however, is demonstrate
that these claims are correct by example—by selecting the single person (Antonin Scalia) most visibly and capably associated with the opposite claims
and analyzing his body of work to see what it shows. The subtitle of this
book is “Antonin Scalia and the Politics of Disruption,” but an equally accurate subtitle might be “If He Can’t Do It, No One Can.” So, in three of the
book’s final four chapters—“Kulturkampf,” “Home of the Brave,” and “Rescued From the Grave”—Hasen canvasses Scalia’s decisions in a huge range
of substantive areas. This takes up about half the book. And when I say huge,
13. Baird, supra note 12, at 1304.
14 . Id . at 1304 (noting, fourteen years ago, the existence of what was then a “decade of
relatively hardy criticism”). It is also not supposed to be taken literally—“all models are
wrong,” as the authors put it, and deliberately simplify reality. Id . (quoting SEGAL & SPAETH,
supra note 12, at 45.)
15 . See, e .g ., Jeffrey A. Segal et al., Ideological Values and the Votes of U .S . Supreme
Court Justices Revisited, 57 J. POL. 812 (1995) (noting remarkably high correlations of judges’
votes in actual cases and their positioning on a simple attitudinal scale).
16 . See Mark Tushnet, Defending the Indeterminacy Thesis, 16 QLR 339, 341 (1996).
17 . Id .
18 . Id .
19 . Id . at 343 (“Every legal proposition that a lawyer would find professionally respectable to assert is indeterminate.”).
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I mean it: Hasen discusses cases about abortion, same-sex marriage, gun
control, affirmative action, religious freedom, campaign finance, gerrymandering, voting rights, federalism, the death penalty, the Confrontation
Clause, and the so-called “War on Terror” (Chapters Five to Seven). And
that’s just a sample. Simply as a catalog of Scalia’s work in such a large range
of areas, Hasen’s book is valuable—it is the sort of catalog prospective law
clerks used to have to compile for themselves in advance of the interview 20
(though it would have been prudent to avoid Hasen’s occasionally scathing
tone).
A point-by-point discussion of each of Hasen’s arguments in these areas
would run the length of a book, rather than a review of one. But an illustrative example is Chapter Five, Kulturkampf, 21 the title of which is drawn from
one of Scalia’s early gay-rights opinions, Romer v . Evans. 22 This chapter is
dedicated to so-called “culture war” cases—cases about “abortion, same-sex
marriage, affirmative action, guns, and religion” (pp. 89–90). In these cases,
says Hasen, the outcomes for which Scalia voted “always followed [his] conservative instincts” (p. 90). He ended up, says Hasen, “in line with where you
would expect someone with his political, social, and religious commitments
to be” (p. 91). This essential insight is the upshot of more or less all the substantive areas Hasen discusses, with a few exceptions to be named a bit later.
What is interesting, though, is how often Hasen criticizes Scalia for being insufficiently textualist or originalist. It is almost as if even Hasen himself
is drawn to the power of formal methods—he can’t resist. In the book’s introduction, Hasen previews this criticism: Scalia’s “ostensibly neutral principles . . . usually failed to cabin the considerable discretion afforded Supreme
Court justices” (p. 12; emphasis added). Scalia’s problem, Hasen says, was
“that he held himself up to a higher standard that neither he nor the other
justices could meet” (p. 12). (Pause on that left-originating criticism for a
moment: “Textualism and Originalism: The Higher Standard.”) To be clear, I
have no interest in writing an apologia for Scalia’s works. He does not need
me to do it, for one thing. But for another, only a fool would dispute the
proposition that all human beings spend most of their lives believing in
principles that they are unable to adhere to in a significant proportion of
cases. That is why his son, Fr. Paul Scalia, observed (at the justice’s funeral
Mass) that “although [he] believed, he did so imperfectly” and asked the assembled not to show a “false love” for “this sinner, Antonin Scalia,” but ra-

20 . See Ian Samuel, In Memoriam, The Counter-Clerks of Justice Scalia, 10 N.Y.U. J.L. &
LIBERTY 1, 1 (2016).
21. Hasen begins Chapter Five with a discussion of my own essay, id . at 12–13, about
Justice Scalia’s death, in which I describe my role as Scalia’s left-leaning “counter-clerk” during
the Term that the Court first confronted the question of same-sex marriage (among many other cases). Pp. 86–90. Hasen’s description and interpretation of that essay speaks for itself, and I
will neither affirm nor quarrel with it. But I thought it fair to alert a reader who was unaware
that I am an interested party, of sorts.
22. 517 U.S. 620, 636 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court has mistaken a Kulturkampf for a fit of spite.”).
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ther to “show affection for him and do good for him” by praying that his
“stain of sin be washed away.” 23
In other words: by frequently criticizing Scalia’s decisions on textualist
and originalist grounds, Hasen is arguing “go, and sin no more,” not “do
what thou wilt.” 24 And there is a hint of something there. In his discussion of
affirmative action, for example, Hasen charges that Scalia’s view of a “colorblind” Constitution that generally prohibits public universities from taking
race into account in admissions “appeared to be at odds with the original
understanding of the Equal Protection Clause” (p. 105). Quoting former law
clerk Gil Seinfeld’s essay on the occasion of Scalia’s death, 25 Hasen notes that
historians have documented a fairly rich body of evidence that, in the years
following ratification of the Reconstruction Amendments, Congress routinely enacted laws benefiting black Americans specifically. “The most prominent of these federal race-conscious measures was the Freedmen’s Bureau
Act, which established a federal bureaucracy whose explicit mission was to
provide assistance to African Americans, including food, clothing, health
care, and employment.” 26 There are answers to those arguments (for one, the
Equal Protection Clause does not by its terms apply to Congress), 27 but it is a
fair point that Justice Scalia, so far as I am aware, never engaged with them.
To call that a failing, one must care about history—more broadly, one must
care about method. Hasen insists that method is basically irrelevant, but
even he cannot resist its pull.
When I raised this argument with Hasen privately, he supplied two answers, both of which deserve a reply on the merits. First, he observed that
one can criticize a system as internally inconsistent or badly applied without
thinking the system is good. That is fair enough, though note that this critique (“textualism can be badly applied and is internally inconsistent”) is different than “textualism inevitably produces bad results,” which, for the upcoming “weak reply,” is all I will need to demonstrate. But to me, Hasen’s
critiques of (for example) the LSD blotter-paper case are more devastating
than this reply modestly suggests: Hasen’s argument is utterly devastating to
Easterbrook’s opinion on the merits, and I think would be so even to many
conservatives. (More on that in Part III.) Second, Hasen noted that his cri-

23 . Justice Antonin Scalia Funeral Mass, C-SPAN (Feb. 20, 2016), https://www.cspan.org/video/?404962-1/justice-antonin-scalia-funeral-mass [https://perma.cc/6PKV-SZX4].
24 . John 8:11.
25. P. 106 (quoting Gil Seinfeld, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Reflections of a Counterclerk, 114 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 111, 118–19 (2016)).
26. David Gans & Adam Winkler, Online Fisher Symposium: Affirmative Action Is Consistent with Original Meaning, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 5, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://
www.scotusblog.com/2012/09/online-fisher-symposium-affirmative-action-is-consistent-withoriginal-meaning/ [https://perma.cc/S6T2-NNJQ].
27. U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV (the former requiring that the national government
provide only “due process of law,” and the latter requiring the state governments to afford
“equal protection of the law” to all people); see, e .g ., Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the
Colorblind Constitution, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 71 (2013).
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tique is still compatible with the idea of looking to text as a starting point—
but in conjunction with legislative history and contemporary values. To that,
I would ask only: so if we agree that text will settle some cases, then what will
actually end up dividing textualists from purposivists? And to that, I will (for
reasons of space) incorporate by reference the more-or-less canonical account of the answer to that question. 28
Hasen is not a fan of Scalia’s opinions on nearly any of the issues he discusses in the culture-war chapter (or most of the others): abortion, same-sex
marriage, affirmative action (Chapter Five). But his critique is most powerful
on the third of these, the sole issue where Hasen is able to level really effective originalist counterarguments. 29 Scalia has lent Hasen a yardstick by
which to measure him, and it enables Hasen to argue (not without some
force) that the decisions on affirmative action didn’t measure up. If Scalia
embraced a more Hasenian “ideology and a sense of fair results” method
(p. 37)—as does, say, Justice Alito (p. 41)—by what yardstick could we criticize his vote in any of these cases? Only our own view that he was wrong
about the merits of affirmative action or abortion or whatever. And fair
enough. But if that is all the business of the Court is supposed to be, then it is
hard to keep out of one’s head the bothersome thought that we have a mechanism for resolving disagreements among citizens about contested policy issues: legislatures, filled using elections in which those citizens get to participate. More on that later.
II.

IF METHOD DOESN’T MATTER, THEN NO METHOD IS BAD

The weak reply to Hasen goes something like this: If textualism and
originalism do not constrain judicial discretion, and if no other method of
interpretation does either, then the indeterminacies of formal methods in
practice do not supply any reason to abandon them for any other method. In
fact, the selection of method is—literally—irrelevant. So, what’s all the fuss
about? On this account, choosing a judicial method is something like choosing a language to write in: you can express ideas equally well in English and
Italian, 30 so it would be rather silly to argue against the choice of one or the
other. Hasen, in other words, has proven too much.

28. John F. Manning, What Divides Textualists from Purposivists?, 106 COLUM. L. REV.
70, 70 (2006) (acknowledging that modern textualists “acknowledge that statutory language
has meaning only in context, and that judges must consider a range of extratextual evidence to
ascertain textual meaning,” just as sophisticated purposivists “posited their own ‘reasonable
person’ framework to make purposive interpretation more objective”). In one sense, Hasen
and I are recreating in miniature the multigenerational argument about formal methods that
has gotten us here and perhaps thereby narrowing the ultimate space of disagreement. Still,
that leaves a question about what’s to be done—which I address at the end of this Review.
29 . See, e .g ., p. 103 (“[Justice Scalia] ignored evidence of special programs for newly
freed slaves at the time of ratification, which indicated contemporaneous understandings of the
amendment’s scope.”).
30 . Compare, e .g ., DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE INFERNO OF DANTE ALIGHIERI 318 (J.M. Dent
& Co., 1906) (1320) (“Cosi s’osserva in me lo contrapasso.”), with Treehouse of Horror IV, THE
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At points, Hasen seems to at least suggest that textualism actually does
produce somewhat determinate results, but that those results are (as he puts
it) “nutty” (p. 39) and “unfair” (p. 30). Hasen goes so far as to say that textualism has “harsh results” as its “inevitable product” (p. 28; emphasis added).
To which one is tempted to reply: Well, which is it? Given that Hasen has
argued that no decisionmaking theory in fact provides any constraint on
judges, he cannot be simultaneously correct that textualism forces judges
(inevitably!) into harsh results. And the same must logically be true of
originalism. It would in fact be quite strange if a focus on text produced inherently unjust results in a way that attention to the committee process, for
example, did not—what would be the causal mechanism? Hasen does not
say, partly, I suspect, because he does not really believe textualism requires
any particular results, good or bad. “Any stick to beat a dog,” as the justice
used to say, but Hasen’s heart is not in this part of the critique.
To be sure, Hasen quotes the Supreme Court’s decision in Lamie v .
United States Trustee (a bankruptcy case), which said that courts should not
“soften the import of Congress’ chosen words even if we believe the words
lead to a harsh outcome,” 31 and then goes on to collect a random handful of
cases in a variety of substantive areas that cite Lamie for that proposition. 32
But it is equally true, from the perspective of a textualist, that a court should
not harden the import of Congress’ chosen words even if the court believes
they lead to an unduly generous outcome. Lamie is a statement about legislative supremacy, 33 not the virtues of cruelty: policy judgments should be reserved to the legislature to the maximum extent possible, and nothing more.
Almost as if to prove this point, Hasen, once again, cannot resist textualist criticism of the individual “harsh” decisions he discusses—cannot, in other words, resist suggesting that a fair reading of the text would have produced a more generous result. For example, Hasen discusses a fairly wellknown drug case, United States v . Marshall, 34 decided by the Seventh Circuit
in 1990 (pp. 27–28). The question was whether the mandatory minimum
sentence for selling a “mixture” of LSD that weighed more than one gram
was triggered if the drug and the blotter paper it was dissolved onto weighed
at least that much. 35 In an opinion by Judge Easterbrook (a prominent textualist), the court said yes: “Ordinary parlance calls the paper containing tiny
crystals of LSD a mixture.” 36 Nonsense, says Hasen: “What ordinary speaker
SIMPSONS (1993) www.simpsonsworld.com/video/27520611805 [https://perma.cc/XU2BCQUU] (“So, you like donuts, eh? Well, have all the donuts in the world!”).
31. P. 28 (quoting Lamie v. United States Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004)).
32. Pp. 28–29. It is a bit weird to cite a case as obscure as Lamie for this proposition,
especially because it is written by Justice Kennedy, who was (as Hasen observes, in fairness) no
one’s idea of a committed textualist or a formalist of any sort. See p. 28. But it is not inaccurate—I think any committed textualist would say the same thing.
33 . Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 538 (2004).
34. 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990).
35. P. 27 (quoting Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1314).
36. P. 27 (quoting Marshall, 908 F.2d at 1317).
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of English would refer to LSD-laced blotter paper as a ‘mixture’ of drug and
paper?” (p. 28). That response, which I think is absolutely correct, sounds in
textualism. So it is not true, therefore, that formal methods necessarily lead
to “harsh” outcomes. Easterbrook just got Marshall wrong. Or, if you like:
there is no right answer, and textualism can supply “the defendant wins” just
as easily as “the defendant loses.” The same could be said about the other
statutory cases Hasen discusses. As he notes, for example, each opinion in
Yates v . United States (which was about whether fish are “tangible object[s]”
for the purpose of a particular obstruction-of-justice statute) “focused primarily upon textual analysis” (p. 33). 37
For a believer in the indeterminacy thesis, you can always “get there
from here,” so to speak. In any legally interesting case, it will be possible to
justify victory for either side using formal methods like textualism and
originalism in a way that will appear legitimate to well-socialized lawyers. In
the culture-war chapter, for example, Hasen observes that Scalia’s “conservative” instincts, rather than strict application of originalism, led to his opinions in cases about same-sex marriage and abortion (pp. 89–90). But although Hasen does not argue that this was an incorrect conclusion on
originalist grounds, others have. Steven Calabresi—a founder of the Federalist Society—has argued that the Constitution guarantees same-sex marriage
as an originalist matter. 38 Others have argued the same about abortion. 39
Hasen describes Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Lawrence v . Texas,
which invalidated state laws criminalizing sodomy, as one based on “principles of a living Constitution” (p. 99). But others have argued that sentencing
gays and lesbians to prison terms for having sex would be “cruel and unusual” under an original understanding of the Eighth Amendment and thus unconstitutional. 40 Both the majority and dissenting opinions in Heller deployed a basically originalist method. 41

37. By the way: the plurality opinion in Yates, in favor of the defendant and against the
government, was written by Justice Ginsburg, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Breyer
and Sotomayor; Justice Alito concurred separately in the judgment; and the dissent was written
by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Kennedy. Yates v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 1074 (2015) (plurality opinion). Whatever explains that lineup, it isn’t the attitudinal model.
38. Steven G. Calabresi & Hannah Begley, Originalism and Same Sex Marriage, SSRN
(Feb. 25, 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2509443 [https://
perma.cc/QT3W-F47K] (“One of the most important public civil rights issues of the modern
era is whether the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, as originally understood
and modified by reading it through the lens of the Nineteenth Amendment, protects a right to
gay marriage. We believe it does, and we seek in this essay to briefly explain why we reach the
conclusion we do.”).
39. Jack M. Balkin, Abortion and Original Meaning, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 291 (2007);
Andrew Koppelman, Originalism, Abortion, and the Thirteenth Amendment, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. 1917 (2012).
40. Steven G. Calabresi, Lawrence, the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Supreme Court’s
Reliance on Foreign Constitutional Law: An Originalist Reappraisal, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1097
(2004). Calabresi argues that because the only penalty in Lawrence was a small fine, there was
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That, in sum, is the weak reply: that by committing himself to some version of the indeterminacy thesis, Hasen has eliminated his ability to argue
that any particular judicial methodology is inferior (as a matter of substantive results) to any other. That is not an argument for formalism of any sort,
of course. But it does reduce substantially the argumentative burden that a
formalist must carry: any advantage, no matter how slight, is sufficient to
overcome “they’re all the same in the end.”
III. STILL THE LESSER EVIL
The strong reply to Hasen, however, goes further and attempts to supply
that advantage. Formalist methods like textualism and originalism, or—
more precisely—methods that at least aspire to determinate results, are better than “no worse.” Instead, they both provide a mechanism that has both a
demonstrated ability to get judges to vote against their imputed policy preferences and—though this is speculative—a mechanism that provides a potential cause for why they might do so. In this Part, I address each.
First: Can formal methods really get judges to vote differently than
they’d vote if they were “Rep. So-and-So” vs. “Justice So-and-So”? Hasen
says no—that the greatest failing of formal methods like textualism and
originalism is their “hubris.” 42 By this, he means the “unwarranted sense of
certainty” (p. 26) formalism inspires that judges can figure out the right answer in legal cases by relying on the text alone: in reality, no method can “restrict judicial discretion” and the outcomes “[i]n the most important cases”
will always “be driven by ideology and a sense of fair results” (p. 36–37). But
if the greatest failing of textualism and originalism is that they encourage
judges to disregard their own ideology and sense of fair results, even if imperfectly, that is a strange failing to call hubris. Attempting to constrain oneself, even without perfect success, is not hubris but its opposite. And more
importantly, there is at least some evidence that it worked, at least for Scalia,
at least some of the time.
Consider a case that Hasen does not discuss: Whitman v . American
Trucking Ass’ns, a foundational case about the Clean Air Act. 43 Whitman
concerned national air-quality standards set by the EPA. One question presented in the case was whether the EPA was permitted to take the economic
cost of pollution control into account when setting those standards. 44 The
American Trucking Association (warning of “closing down whole industries
and thereby impoverishing the workers and consumers dependent upon
those industries” 45) argued that the EPA should take such costs into acno Eighth Amendment problem, id . at 1129, but it is trivial to imagine the argument being
modified to omit this distinction while still being phrased in thoroughly originalist terms.
41. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008).
42 . See pp. 26, 47–48.
43. 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
44 . Whitman, 531 U.S. at 462.
45 . Id . at 466–67.
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count—articulated, in other words, a fairly mainline conservative position
against excessive environmental regulation. No, said Justice Scalia, writing a
thoroughly textualist opinion for the Court. The relevant provision directed
the EPA to set air quality standards “the attainment and maintenance of
which . . . are requisite to protect the public health” with “an adequate margin of safety.” 46 That was that, Scalia thought: “Were it not for the hundreds
of pages of briefing respondents have submitted on the issue, one would
have thought it fairly clear that this text does not permit the EPA to consider
costs in setting the standards.” 47 Whitman was a win for the precise groups
you might have expected Justice Scalia to be dubious of: not just environmentalists but (quelle horreur) the actual EPA, arrayed against an industry—
truckers!—that could hardly be more quintessentially red-state American.
Nonetheless, the text said what it said. In another case, Decker v . Northwest
Environmental Defense Center, 48 Scalia’s textualist commitments inspired a
solo dissent in an 8–1 loss, in which he was (so to speak) more Catholic than
the Pope, taking a more pro-environment position than Barack Obama’s
EPA. Using the “familiar tools of textual interpretation,” he concluded that
the logging industry was not permitted to discharge stormwater runoff from
logging roads without a permit. 49
When it comes to constitutional law, Hasen discusses but explains away
the most famous example of Scalia voting against his presumed political
preferences: Texas v . Johnson, in which he was part of the 5–4 majority that
invalidated Texas’s law against flag burning. 50 Scalia himself loved to cite this
example of his originalist method committing him sometimes to vote for
outcomes he personally disliked. 51 Hasen calls this just a symptom of his
“conservative libertarian” instincts. But in truth, this starts to feel like an example of over-fitting the model to the data—and cannot even, on its own
terms, explain how or why this ostensible “libertarian” would have voted for
the EPA in important environmental-law cases. Although I am certain Hasen
could provide an attitudinal-indeterminate explanation for all of these votes,
at a certain point, Occam’s Razor must take over, and we must confront the
uncomfortable suspicion that method might actually be doing some work.
Although Whitman and Decker and even Johnson are interesting, they
pale in comparison to the most prominent and extended Scalian heterodoxy
against the imputed political imperatives of a Reaganite conservative: criminal procedure. (By “criminal procedure,” I mean the protections of the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments—what might be called primary constitutional criminal procedure—as opposed to things like post-conviction habeas review or the limits on punishment imposed by the Eighth Amend46 .
47 .
48.
49 .
50.
51.

Id . at 472 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2000)).
Id . at 465.
568 U.S. 597 (2013).
Decker, 568 U.S. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
491 U.S. 397 (1989).
And I, accordingly, have discussed it before. Samuel, supra note 20.
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ment.) Scalia led what can fairly be called left-wing revolutions in several of
these areas, including the Fourth Amendment’s protections against unreasonable searches and seizures, 52 the Sixth Amendment right to be confronted
with the witnesses against oneself, 53 the right to a jury trial, 54 and even the
right of a citizen against detention without trial. 55 Scalia successfully led a
multiyear crusade to invalidate an important provision of the “Armed Career Criminal Act” (it is what it sounds like) as unconstitutionally vague and
thus unfair to criminal defendants. 56 And he wrote what one prominent
commentator called his “smartest, wittiest ruling of all time” in a Fourth
Amendment case concerning whether a state could take an arrestee’s DNA
without any reason to believe it would show evidence of a crime (he said
no). 57 In that dissent, he was joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan—a lineup that ought to serve as at least a mild rebuke to the attitudinal model of judging.
Hasen covers this entire subject in the course of just five pages almost at
the end of the book (pp. 151–56). The criminal-procedure opinions the book
discusses are Crawford v . Washington (and three later cases in the same line,
Davis v . Washington, Michigan v . Bryant, and Ohio v . Clark), Apprendi v .
New Jersey (and another later companion United States v . Booker), Johnson v .
United States, United States v . Jones, Kyllo v . United States, and Scalia’s dissent in Maryland v . King (pp. 151–55). That is a lot to cram into five pages,
especially since Crawford takes up three of them. The others zip by in about
a paragraph each. That is too bad, because Scalia’s criminal-procedure cases
are strong evidence that his methodological commitments really did lead
him to outcomes that an ordinary conservative might have found objectionable.
Of course, I am not suggesting that textualism and originalism produced
uniformly left-wing results in Scalia’s hands; any such suggestion, in addition to being absurd, would be amply contradicted by the bulk of counterexamples in Hasen’s book. What I am suggesting, however, is that it sometimes
did. That is hard to square with the idea that judicial method does not and
cannot restrict judicial discretion enough to undermine fundamentally out-

52 . See, e .g ., Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. 1 (2013); United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400
(2012).
53. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
54. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 498–99 (2000) (Scalia, J., concurring). It
would be fair to say that Scalia did not “lead” the revolution in Apprendi, insofar as he wrote a
concurrence rather than the majority opinion. But he was the author of the dissent in Almendarez-Torres v . United States, 523 U.S. 224 (1998), which prefigured and went even further
than Apprendi, and which was also joined by his three most liberal colleagues—Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg.
55. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 554–79 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
57. Jeffrey Rosen, A Damning Dissent: Scalia’s Smartest, Wittiest Ruling of All Time,
NEW REPUBLIC (June 4, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/article/113375/supreme-court-dnacase-antonin-scalias-dissent-ages [https://perma.cc/FF4Z-KXSA].
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come-driven judicial decisionmaking, as Hasen argues. Why would Scalia
have voted that way in these cases? Was he a secret environmentalist? (Maybe that explains the hunting—a clever cover story for his love of the woods.)
A softie for armed career criminals? (Maybe that explains the hunting.)
Although I do not know what Hasen would say, one reply to these examples is that such cases can be explained away by a person’s natural desire
to demonstrate fidelity to a “big idea” with which they have become personally associated, so long as the stakes are not too high. In other words, it is extremely satisfying to be able to point to areas where you voted “against type,”
and crow: “You see? Because of my commitment to a neutral philosophy, I
am a principled jurist, unlike some people around here that I could name.”
And it is certainly the case that whatever the ordinary judge might enjoy,
Scalia himself enjoyed highlighting those examples in public. 58
If that is true, and I think it at least somewhat is, then it is a virtue of
formal methods of the best sort: one that makes them compatible with cynical (and often correct) assumptions about human nature. Formal methods
with big aspirations to neutrality and clear rules of play are big ideas, orthogonal to political ideology, 59 to which one’s human pride can be semireliably lashed. By contrast, if one adjudicates cases simply based on one’s firstorder “ideology and . . . sense of fair results,” as Hasen argues is inevitable
(p. 37), then crowing about one’s principles is unavailable—voting “against
type” for such people is impossible. Another way of putting it: in those cases,
Scalia was voting his “ideology”; he just had an ideological commitment to
formalism that exceeded his ideological commitment to business-friendly
regulation, or jailing Beatniks, or whatever, in those cases.
It is fair to say, as Hasen does, that in the absolute highest-stakes cases
methodological commitments may be overwhelmed by other factors. But I
would have thought that a reason to encourage ideological commitments to a
methodology, rather than tear them down as foolish illusions. That is especially so if one is a left-leaning person staring down the barrel of a young,
conservative Supreme Court and pondering whether to loudly proclaim to
them: “Did you know that all you’re up to up there is politics?” All that invites is the chilling reply: “Come to think of it, you have a point.”
IV. THE PERKS OF NOT BEING A WALLFLOWER
In this Review, I have mostly discussed Scalia’s substantive legacy and
judicial method. This mirrors the book’s focus and what I think are Hasen’s
main subjects of interest. But in a way, Hasen’s most serious charge against

58 . See, e .g ., Scott Bomboy, Justice Antonin Scalia Rails Again About Flag-Burning
“Weirdoes,” NAT’L CONST. CTR.: CONST. DAILY (Nov. 12, 2015), https://constitutioncenter.org/
blog/justice-antonin-scalia-rails-again-about-flag-burning-weirdoes [https://perma.cc/89VQKL3B] (“ ‘If it were up to me, I would put in jail every sandal-wearing, scruffy-bearded weirdo
who burns the American flag,’ Scalia said. ‘But I am not king.’ ”).
59. William Baude, Essay, Originalism as a Constraint on Judges, 84 U. CHI. L. REV.
2213, 2224–26 (2017).
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Scalia is buried in a roughly twenty-page interlude halfway through the
book. I have saved discussion of it for last, in part because it is not easily integrated into my argument above but also because it is simultaneously too
important to ignore. This interlude (Chapter Four) is where Hasen pauses to
consider two facets of Justice Scalia’s style: the way he wrote (especially in
dissent) and the way he spoke (especially in public appearances).
Justice Scalia’s writing, says Hasen, contained “an unparalleled level of
nastiness and sarcasm,” which “served to coarsen judicial discourse and may
have helped undermine the legitimacy of the institution he appeared to love
so dearly” (p. 67). To be sure, he was also a “charmer who often played for
laughs at the Supreme Court’s oral argument,” an “engaging and interesting
writer on a Court whose other justices could make even the most pressing
social and legal issues seem mind-numbingly boring,” and “a gregarious
public intellectual” (p. 66). But Hasen repeatedly asserts that the justice’s
writing style served to delegitimize the Court as an institution (pp. 67, 74).
There have always been some people who bristled at the justice’s writing
style, including some of his former law clerks. 60 But it is important to separate the different criticisms that such a bristler might have. One would be
purely aesthetic—they just find strong language distasteful. Whereas I find
the phrase “disappearing trail of . . . legalistic argle-bargle” 61 to be so funny
that I actually laughed aloud while writing this sentence, they do not, and
that is that. An essentially gustatory objection like that is not really a matter
for debate any more than my distaste for sweet-potato fries or Scalia’s fondness for Nero d’Avola.
A different claim would be that Scalia’s style was counterproductive in
the sense that it actually changed outcomes in particular cases. One sometimes hears that sort of thing. 62 An especially frequent object of speculation
in this respect is that Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v .
Casey 63 might have come out differently if Justice Scalia had been nicer—
Hasen observes that rumors to that effect have circulated for years (pp. 71–
72). As Hasen correctly observes, that particular rumor is contradicted by
what we know about how Casey was drafted (pp. 71–72). Nevertheless, the
sense—a judicial version of “you catch more flies with honey than you do
with vinegar”—persists.
Personally, I have always found this suggestion rather shocking—if it is
true, it is far less an indictment of Scalia than anyone allegedly “driven to the
center” by him. Really, imagine: you have spent your entire life believing
60 . E .g ., Gil Seinfeld, The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly: Reflections of a Counterclerk, 114
MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 111, 118–19 (2016).
61. United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744, 799 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
62 . See, e .g ., Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Supreme Court, 1991 Term—Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 122 n.602 (1992) (noting “speculat[ion]”
from observers that “Justice Scalia’s blistering sarcasm toward Justice O’Connor’s and Justice
Kennedy’s opinions may indicate some personal animosity that has driven them toward the
center”).
63. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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that, say, affirmative action is not just wrong but actually unconstitutional.
Then, in an unrelated case, perhaps years earlier, one of your colleagues describes your opinion, in dissent (that is, you won!), as, say, “irrational.” 64 Is
the idea that you then actually change your mind about the right answer in
the affirmative-action case years later? How does that work, exactly? Or is
the idea that you continue to hold your previous belief but vote against it to
spite your colleague? I don’t know, but if there are such people, perhaps the
label “Justice of Contradictions” should have been reserved for them.
Much more likely, to me, is that Justice Scalia’s writing style greatly
magnified his influence on American law, albeit not in ways that Hasen is
likely to celebrate. Justice Scalia’s writing style likely had its greatest influence not on his colleagues, but on other readers: law students, young lawyers, even laypeople interested in the business of the Court. Hasen opens the
style chapter by discussing a speech by Paul Clement (one of the nation’s
leading Supreme Court advocates and a former clerk for Justice Scalia) to the
Federalist Society’s national convention about his former boss’s style. The
audience, Hasen correctly reports, ate it up (pp. 64–66). Now, why do you
suppose that might be? In terms of his votes, Justice Scalia was not so different from (say) Justice Thomas. 65 And Justice Thomas, I am sure, was wellloved in that room too. But could it be that a crisp, confrontational style,
which eschews the Marquis-of-Queensbury rules mostly fashionable among
the elite, is itself a mechanism of influence? And as to the admirers in that
room: just who is it, do you think, that will be selecting judges and justices—
that will become judges and justices—when the Republican Party controls
the selection? Isn’t winning the affection of such people more or less the definition of the sort of influence that counts?
A third sort of criticism, one Hasen takes very seriously, is that the justice’s sharp dissents (and his public appearances, which Hasen criticizes for
having a similar tone) were bad because they impaired the “legitimacy” of
the Supreme Court as an institution. By this, Hasen means that Scalia “contributed to popular cynicism about Supreme Court decisionmaking” by accusing his colleagues of acting as “super-legislators” rather than as judges deciding cases on the basis of traditional legal materials (pp. 74–75).
I will confess that I find this criticism by Hasen somewhat perplexing,
because he is more or less an adherent of this exact model of judging—he believes, in other words, that there is no neutral method judges can use to decide cases and that they will always in the end be required to take their own
policy preferences into account (pp. 36–37). In other words, Hasen thinks
64 . See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 536, n.* (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Similarly irrational is the new concept that
Justice O’Connor introduces into the law in order to achieve her result . . . .”).
65. Jeremy Bowers et al., Which Supreme Court Justices Vote Together Most and Least
Often, N.Y. TIMES: THE UPSHOT (updated July 3, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/
interactive/2014/06/24/upshot/24up-scotus-agreement-rates.html
[https://perma.cc/XJ6HPFRT] (finding that in 280 signed decisions from cases argued between the 2010 and 2013
terms, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas voted together 91 percent of the time).
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that judges are in an important sense superlegislators and wrote a book illustrating the ways in which not even the most prominent adherent of the opposite view could resist behaving that way. If Hasen is right, then Justice
Scalia’s stoking of “popular cynicism about Supreme Court decisionmaking”
(p. 75) was correct—he was, in other words, accurately informing the public
about what the Court is doing. What’s wrong with that? Is the idea that we’re
all supposed to keep quiet about what judges are really up to, lest the plebes
catch on? Then why is Hasen writing a book letting everyone in on the secret?
At the core of this latter critique is a sense that Justice Scalia has undermined the “respectful tone” that he says lawyers used to use in the good old
days (p. 85). Hmm. Really? In his legendary dissent in Korematsu v . United
States, this is how Justice Murphy opened:
This exclusion of “all persons of Japanese ancestry, both alien and nonalien,” from the Pacific Coast area on a plea of military necessity in the absence of martial law ought not to be approved. Such exclusion goes over
“the very brink of constitutional power,” and falls into the ugly abyss of racism. 66

I would not change a word of this. Would Hasen? I am not a good judge of
such things, but is there something about accusing the President of the United States of having gone over “the ugly abyss of racism” that is somehow
more genteel than “cannot be taken seriously” (probably the most legendary
body slam that Justice Scalia is supposed to have delivered to one of Justice
O’Connor’s opinions)? 67 (Truth to tell, I have never really understood what
scandalized people so badly about Scalia’s remark, but it has certainly entered the canon. 68) Murphy goes on to describe the government’s actions as
“one of the most sweeping and complete deprivations of constitutional rights
in the history of this nation,” 69 resembling “the abhorrent and despicable
treatment of minority groups by the dictatorial tyrannies which this nation is
now pledged to destroy,” 70 and he began the dissent’s final paragraph by saying: “I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism.” 71 I do too. Should
Murphy have been more polite? Why?
66. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting) (emphasis added) (quoting J.L. DeWitt, U.S. Army, Civilian Exclusion Order No. 34 (1942), and
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 111 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring)).
67. Webster, 492 U.S. at 533 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) (“Justice O’Connor’s assertion . . . that a ‘fundamental rule of judicial restraint’ requires
us to avoid reconsidering Roe, cannot be taken seriously.” (quoting id . at 526 (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
68 . See, e .g ., David M. O’Brien, This Time, It’s Personal: Justice Scalia’s Increasing Incivility, L.A. TIMES (July 14, 1996) (describing Scalia as “blasting” O’Connor with this frankly
tepid remark), http://articles.latimes.com/1996-07-14/opinion/op-24100_1_justice-antoninscalia [https://perma.cc/8VAA-7296].
69 . Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 235 (Murphy, J., dissenting).
70 . Id . at 240.
71 . Id . at 242.
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Of course, you might respond: Korematsu was different. The internment
of American citizens on the basis of race, you will say, really is racist—and is
just not the same thing as a decision protecting a woman’s right to elect an
abortion. But notice: such a reply implicitly admits that sharp language is
justified when the chips are really down and a moral travesty is afoot. Of
course, that is exactly what many people feel about abortion, the subject of
Roe, Webster (the source of the “cannot be taken seriously” line), and Casey.
Many people do not agree with them, of course, but now we are having a
disagreement about substance, not writing style—suggesting only the banal
fact that people enjoy a sharp tongue when it is saying things they agree with,
and not otherwise.
Or consider Justice Holmes’s dissent in Lochner v . New York. In it, he
remarks—famously—that “[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics.” 72 That sarcastic jab sums up everything
that is wrong with the majority’s opinion. Would Hasen have had Holmes
take it out? Or how about Dred Scott? In his dissent, Justice Curtis wrote that
“we have no longer a Constitution; we are under the government of individual men, who for the time being have power to declare what the Constitution
is, according to their own views of what it ought to mean.” 73 That sounds
familiar to my ear—Scalia wrote variants of that more times than I can
count—and I do not think that Curtis was undermining the legitimacy of the
Court by pointing out the truth. To be sure, Curtis’s remarks are milder than
some of Scalia’s extrastrength scourgings, but Dred Scott is also 160 years
old—by the standards of the day, that was stern stuff. 74
Or (to take an election-law example I know Hasen might appreciate)
how about Bush v . Gore? There were four separate dissents in that case, but I
will bet the one you remember is Justice Stevens’s, and in particular, its closing paragraph, in which he says that the majority’s decision “can only lend
credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work of judges throughout the
land” and concludes with its most famous lines: “Although we may never
know with complete certainty the identity of the winner of this year’s Presidential election, the identity of the loser is perfectly clear. It is the Nation’s
confidence in the judge as an impartial guardian of the rule of law.” 75 That is
a great, hard-hitting line, a scorching of the majority that I bet Justice Scalia
might even have admired simply as a matter of craftsmanship. Would Hasen
take it out? (Does Bush v . Gore not count because it was handed down after
Scalia had already coarsened the culture?)
I could go on and on. But I will restrict myself to one more, perhaps the
most illustrative of all. In FCC v . Pacifica Foundation, the Supreme Court

72. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
73. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 621 (1857) (Curtis, J., dissenting).
74 . See Laura Krugman Ray, Judicial Personality: Rhetoric and Emotion in Supreme
Court Opinions, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 193, 195 (2002) (noting that through the nineteenth
century Supreme Court justices often wrote in an impersonal style).
75. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 128–29 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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approved the government’s power to censor speech on the airwaves that was
indecent but not obscene. 76 Justice Brennan wrote, in dissent, words that are
just about as hard-hitting as anything Scalia ever wrote—and, in fact, validate the style they both enjoyed from time to time:
[T]here runs throughout the opinions of my Brothers Powell and Stevens . . . a depressing inability to appreciate that in our land of cultural pluralism, there are many who think, act, and talk differently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities. It is only
an acute ethnocentric myopia that enables the Court to approve the censorship of communications solely because of the words they contain. 77

What Brennan meant is that what sounds coarse to one ear doesn’t sound
coarse to another. If you have a sense that the country is not the exclusive
property of well-mannered Mayflower descendants and belongs equally (to
pick a random example) to working-class Catholic children born of southern-European immigrants, you might actually even value an ability to talk
like a normal person. On Brennan’s view, 78 delicate enforcement of the genteel sensibilities of the elite is basically a way to enforce their substantive
views on hoi polloi:
Today’s decision will thus have its greatest impact on broadcasters desiring
to reach, and listening audiences composed of, persons who do not share
the Court’s view as to which words or expressions are acceptable and who,
for a variety of reasons, including a conscious desire to flout majoritarian
conventions, express themselves using words that may be regarded as offensive by those from different socio-economic backgrounds. In this context, the Court’s decision may be seen for what, in the broader perspective,
it really is: another of the dominant culture’s inevitable efforts to force
those groups who do not share its mores to conform to its way of thinking,
acting, and speaking. 79

And who am I to disagree with William Brennan?
CONCLUSION
I would like to close by posing the following question to people who
agree with Hasen—who agree, in other words, that Justice Scalia’s purport-

76. 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (plurality opinion in part).
77 . Pacifica Found ., 438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
78. In this as in so many other matters, Scalia did not agree with Brennan on the particulars of this controversy. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 527 (2009)
(plurality opinion) (expressing “doubt, to begin with, that small-town broadcasters run a
heightened risk of liability for indecent utterances. In programming that they originate, their
down-home local guests probably employ vulgarity less than big-city folks; and small-town
stations generally cannot afford or cannot attract foul-mouthed glitteratae from Hollywood.”).
To this, all I can say is that Scalia may have misapprehended his own virtues: though vulgarity,
in the pejorative sense, was not his thing (usually), in the more benign sense of “drawn of the
vulgate,” it was absolutely a register in which he brilliantly sung when he needed to.
79 . Pacifica Found ., 438 U.S. at 776–77 (footnote omitted).
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edly neutral methods did not produce, in practice, neutral answers and who
believe, in fact, that there is no method that can. 80 The question is further directed to the people who are unpersuaded by my argument above—that the
adoption of relatively more formal methods might still be a good idea even if
Hasen’s descriptive account is largely true, as I believe it is. 81 And this is a
question posed at the level of practical reality, not ideal theory: even if one
believes that the right answers to legal questions exist at some level by definition, my question is about how to order a world that is not governed by Justice Hercules, 82 or even Justice Holmes.
The question I want to pose is this: So what should be done about it?
That is, if Hasen’s argument is correct, then what should change about the
role of courts in American democracy? Many of the most important issues in
American life are settled by the Supreme Court. In just the last few years, the
Court has decided whether same-sex couples will be permitted to marry, 83
whether the Affordable Care Act should continue to exist, 84 whether states
may regulate most abortion providers out of existence, 85 whether universities
may consider race in admissions, 86 whether corporations may spend money
to influence elections, 87 and the circumstances under which the government
may learn the movements of any or every person in the country. 88 And, of
course, there was the small matter of who was going to be president after Bill
Clinton. 89 That is a vast role indeed.
If one is with Hasen, “nothing: things are good, and the role of the
courts should remain the same” is at minimum an uncomfortable answer to
my question, given standard assumptions about why the federal courts’ current practices are legitimate. 90 That is because it is extremely difficult to justify the extent of federal courts’ power if there is no way to objectively
demonstrate what the relevant legal materials require in a large proportion
of, and in the most important, cases. (Or, phrased differently, if the relevant
materials can respectably support either answer in a large percentage of cases.) In 1959, Herbert Wechsler argued that although judicial review was justified by the text of the Supremacy Clause, it was nonetheless essential that

80 . Cf . Tushnet, supra note 16, at 351 (“[I]f no . . . methods eliminate indeterminacy[],
we may be faced with a real challenge to common understandings about the rule of law”).
81 . See supra Part III.
82 . See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE (1986).
83. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
84. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
85. Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
86. Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016); see also Fisher v. Univ. of
Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297 (2013).
87. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010).
88. Carpenter v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2206 (2018).
89. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000) (per curiam).
90. By “legitimate,” I mean the sense in which it is used in, for example, Jeremy Waldron, Essay, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.J. 1346, 1386–95 (2006).
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the “main constituent of the judicial process” was that it be “genuinely principled,” in the sense that it rests on neutral, general rules that would produce
acceptable results not just in the case at hand but also in “other cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest.” 91 A lot of water has gone over the
dam since Weschler, but I think some version of his argument is still at the
core of many lawyers’ instincts about why federal courts can legitimately exercise power on the scale that they do now. And leaving things the same in a
world of attitudinalism and indeterminacy should be especially unappealing
to liberal critics of Justice Scalia, given that the federal courts are firmly in
the grip of their ideological adversaries and are likely to remain so for a very
long time. So if Hasen is right, and I am wrong, then at minimum there
should be a further discussion about what’s to be done in response—a discussion I am more than willing to have.
One possibility is to aggressively reduce the role of courts in American
political life, in ways both external and internal. Externally, people who agree
with Hasen should logically favor legislation that would reduce the scope of
the judiciary’s jurisdiction or alter its decision procedures in ways that would
make it harder for it to do anything (perhaps supermajority requirements for
invalidating legislation). Internally, at the level of legal doctrine, people who
agree with Hasen should logically favor aggressive deference regimes, which
move decisions out of the courts and into democratically accountable
branches of government like executive agencies and legislatures. 92 Even then,
the judiciary might invalidate attempts at jurisdiction stripping 93 and manipulate deference rules to preserve their authority. In that case, the only solution would be something like court-packing—to win political power and
add members to the courts that would vote more congenially to the majority’s wishes. 94

91. Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L.
REV. 1, 15 (1959).
92 . See, e .g ., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Improving Deference: Chevron as a
Voting Rule, 116 YALE L.J.F. (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/improvingdeference-chevron-as-a-voting-rule [https://perma.cc/R6A2-CTSJ].
93 . See, e .g ., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).
94. This reckless idea is typically advocated by notorious hotheads without an appreciation for the elementary game theory possessed by all of said hotheads’ opponents. See, e .g ., Ian
Samuel, Good Riddance to Anthony Kennedy—Now #PackTheCourts, JEWISH CURRENTS (June
30,
2018),
https://jewishcurrents.org/essay/good-riddance-anthony-kennedy-nowpackthecourts/ [https://perma.cc/4VCK-QKLC].
Of course, there might also be legal challenges to court-packing. See Neil Siegel, Some
Notes on Court-Packing, Then and Now, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 26, 2017, 4:42 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2017/11/some-notes-on-court-packing-then-and-now.html
[https://perma.cc/54D6-HRWJ] (observing that the Senate Judiciary Committee’s report regarding President Roosevelt’s court-packing plan regarded it as “anticonstitutional” and “unconstitutional”). A full reply to that argument is beyond the scope of this Review, though I do
hope to supply that reply. But in brief: on the merits, I doubt it, given how often the Court’s
membership has changed in size for explicitly political reasons. But the real answer, I am sorry
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These are radical ideas, but that does not make them wrong. 95 My point
is not to endorse any particular proposal but to illustrate the need for one if
Hasen is right. And there is, to be clear, at least one thing about which Hasen
is absolutely correct. The story of Justice Scalia’s life on the bench and the
state of play in interpretive method today represents a crucial arc in American legal history. Justice Scalia spent his years on the Court advocating, in
the end very successfully, for the adoption of certain formal legal methods.
Now he is gone, but he has left more than a few disciples, including both of
his successors to the bench. In Hasen’s view, this experiment has been a failure. And in the wake of the failure sits a Court that is stacked with conservative jurists with the formal power to—if they wish—radically remake the law
in ways that Hasen would object to. And so the question for tomorrow is one
that is urgent but, in fairness, beyond the scope of Hasen’s book:
Do you have a better idea?

to say, can only sound in realpolitik: “Better seat the new justices before the challenge to the
legislation reaches the Court.”
95 . Cf . Mark Tushnet, Epstein’s Best of All Possible Worlds: The Rule of Law, 80 U. CHI.
L. REV. 487, 493 (2013) (book review) (“As stated, the form of the argument is, ‘Were X to be
true, there would be dire consequences; therefore X is false.’ To which the response is, ‘Tough
luck.’ ”).

